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Abstract: 
This paper seeks to provide a new approach to peace in order to contribute to a theoretically 
informed approach to peace education and development practice. Arguing that liberal peace is 
counter-productive and can actually betray peace, I offer an alternative approach in order to 
contribute to thinking on peace for educators and development practitioners. Introducing the 
theory of peace that I developed in my recent Ph.D., I explore how utopian and post-structural 
theory conceptualises peace as an open-ended promise, facilitating alternative thinking about 
peace and how to engage with it. I then discuss the implications this has for praxis and finish by 
looking at how the work of translating peace is an important aspect of peace education and 
development. 
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Introduction 
The topic of conflict and peace is receiving increased attention as, despite our technological 
progress, ‘terror’ refuses to decline. The attention conferred by the media, academics and 
policy makers is no less evident in the field of education, where discussions around education 
and conflict are gaining momentum, most recently culminating in the UNESCO 2011 Global 
Monitoring Report The hidden crisis: Armed conflict and education. In addition to 
highlighting the impact of armed conflict on education and its detriment to achieving 
Education For All (EFA), the report also acknowledges the role education can have in 
nurturing identity and values, which can either fuel violence or contribute to peace. 
Within this context this paper seeks to provide a substantially new theory of peace and 
discuss the implications this has on peace education and development. I will start by setting 
the scene for why an alternative theory of peace is needed, arguing that liberal peace is not 
sufficient and alternative theories of peace are required. I will then go on to introduce the 
theory of peace that I developed in my recent Ph.D. work: peace-as-an-event-peace-as- 
utopia, which stresses an undecided and uncontained future which houses an ethical space ‘to 
come’. I posit that conceptualising peace as an open-ended promise facilitates alternative 
thinking about peace and how to engage with peace, and creates an ethical and political 
imperative to act. I then ask how this theory of peace can inform peace education and 
development, and conclude by exploring the work of translation as an important component 
of peace education. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The case for rethinking peace 
My case for rethinking peace is motivated from a criticism of current approaches to peace 
building which are grounded in theories of liberal peace. Liberal peace is synonymous with 
state building, extolling democracy, free markets and human rights as the, apparently, tried 
and tested solutions for peace. However, while liberal peace appears to have become 
embedded as the self-evident answer to conflict and fragile states, I argue that it can actually 
be detrimental for peace. 
The mantras of liberal peace: democracy, free markets, and human rights, are not 
neutral or unproblematic concepts in any context, however the fragile and complex situation 
of a conflicted-affected context further problematises such concepts. In addition, a focus on 
security,  where  references  to  ‘peacekeeping’  denote  military  operations,  engenders  a 
reduction of peace to ‘negative peace’ (Galtung 1996). 
The prominence of free market mechanisms in liberal peace I would argue is a barrier 
to peace. The market, which thrives on competition, can be seen as an adversarial force and 
neo-liberal policies in conflict affected areas can exacerbate social-economic inequality, 
undermining peace. The economic discourses of liberal peace, combined with a securitisation 
discourse, limits understandings of peace, to the exclusion of considerations of structural and 
cultural violence (Galtung 1990). A more critical and broader reading of conflict would 
recognise the role of economics in violence. The commitment to neo-liberal economics found 
in a liberal peace discourse arguably undermines peace. The irony of liberal peace betraying 
itself creates “A violence that sustains our very efforts to fight violence and promote 
tolerance” (Žižek 2008: 1). Neo-liberalism is considered such an important part of building 
peaceful states now that not only are free market mechanisms promoted in fragile states, but 
the economic language of the markets have colonised the language of peace, with terms such 
as ‘peace dividends’ increasing in use, revealing an economic rationalisation and 
instrumentalism within peace-building itself. 
The uncritical imposition of democracy and human rights in conflict affected areas 
can also be problematic for peace. In liberal peace discourses democracy tends to mean 
representative democracy, often indistinct from Western models, and in volatile societies this 
can fuel divisions and lead to majoritarianism. While democracy does extol important values, 
a ‘democratic piety’ (Little 2008) which makes ambiguous promises that take no account of 
the multiplicity or variations of democratic   forms   can obstruct explorations of different 
types of democracy and end-up undermining democratic values. Also, human rights, usually 
linked  with  democracy  in  a  liberal  peace  discourse,  tend  to  focus  on  the  rights  of  the 
individual with little recognition of collective rights. 
Within a liberal peace discourse these problematised concepts merge together to 
reinforce each other and create a strong discourse. As already described, liberal peace relies 
on a formula of liberal state building and free market mechanisms to address conflict. 
Duffield’s (2001) work on the merging of (economic) development and security traces how 
economic stability has established its place in peace building so effectively that now one 
implies the other. This judgment has been so self-assured that it has now earned a status of 
truth that  is ‘self-evident’.  However,  this security discourse  fails to recognise  the  violence 
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inherent in economic systems. Pugh argues that the failure to address forms of violence 
embedded in global capitalism reduces peace building to “a form of riot control directed 
against the unruly parts of the world to uphold liberal peace” (Pugh 2004:41). 
Liberal peace is a Western led discourse which is imposed on apparently fragile 
states, and while it values civil society as important, remains a distinctively international and 
state led intervention. Like all discourses, liberal peace has elements of truth which are 
worked and reworked into concrete knowledge. However, I would argue that it is not the 
panacea that many practitioners and policy makers in the fields of peace building and 
development have come to believe it is. While it may extol some important values it also has 
its shortcomings. An uncritical, blind faith in liberal peace reworks a discourse into a self- 
evident ‘truth’ so that opportunities to reconstruct and build on liberal peace are wasted, and 
through a violence of closure learning from alternatives is denied. 
 
 
Peace theory and peace education 
Peace education is, at its broadest, the fabrication of education (both formal, non-formal or 
informal) as a transforming process that promotes a culture of tolerance and peace. Education 
programmes, policy makers and educational and development practitioners need to 
intentionally adopt or develop a theory of peace to frame and guide them if this is to be 
successful. Despite being the dominant theory within the field of peace studies and peace 
education liberal peace is not the only theory of peace. Most notably Galtung has been 
influential in informing thinking on peace, as the principle founder of peace and conflict 
studies,  and  his  theory  of  negative  and  positive  peace  is  important  (Galtung  1996). 
Hutchinson uses Futures Studies to inform her discussions of a futures orientated peace to 
challenge the dominance of empirical reality to include potential realities, in order to enable 
the imagination of more peaceful futures (Hutchinson 1996). More recently, in her book 
Education and Conflict: Complexity and Chaos, Davies (2004) uses aspects of chaos and 
complexity theory to frame her discussion around peace and conflict.  Similarly, Page (2004) 
has explored the possibility of a theory of peace to inform peace education grounded in the 
idea of ethics, identifying five ethics of peace: virtue, consequential, aesthetic, conservative 
political, and an ethics of care. This list, by no means comprehensive, of theorists on peace 
contributes to an important collective of alternatives to liberal peace. 
However,  while  a  few  pioneers  of  peace  theory  are  challenging  and  exploring 
different theories of peace, liberal peace still remains the hegemonic and traditional discourse 
of peace building.  Arguably, liberal peace has become embedded as the self-evident answer 
to conflict and fragile states and I argue that this is problematic for peace educators and 
development practitioners. Furthermore, liberal peace can be seen as part of a global liberal 
agenda, and it can be argued this is characterized by the positivist language associated with 
economics and the knowledge and information revolution.  Consequently it is possible to 
identify underlying dominant values shared in a hegemonic neo-liberal and modern western 
scientific discourse in global education research and policy trends, with the advancement of a 
performativity and positivistic culture (Green 1997). Similarly, in the field of development, a 
dominant problem-solving approach has emerged, as Escobar explored in his seminal work, 
Encountering Development (1995), and more recently has been analysed by Duffield, who 
   
 
 
 
 
describes the dominant perception of actors  towards conflict as  “essentially  Newtonian  and 
machine-like in conception” (2001: 85). The prevailing discourses within the fields of both 
education and development seem to be characterized by empirical/positivistic discourses and 
problem solving. 
The  impact  on  much  education  and  development  policy  has  been  the  general 
uncritical acceptance of a liberal policy agenda, including liberal peace, with insufficient 
exploration of alternative theories of peace, and the development of prescriptive teaching 
practices. This trend is also apparent in the area of peace education, with the literature mostly 
confining itself to ‘lessons learnt’ and evaluative research. The result has been a toolkit style 
production of manuals and formulas, “ a rather narrow recipe-book approach that is heavily 
dependent in workshop training in mediation and negotiation skills, conflict management, 
non-competitive dialogue and so on”  (Bush and Saltarelli 2000: 22), with little exploration 
of theories of peace. Without critical engagement the causes of violence, peace education will 
be limited to addressing inter-personal issues, doing little to go beyond the “criticism of much 
current peace education, both formal and informal... that it relies on making people be nicer 
to each other” (Fisher et al 2000: 146, cited in Davies 2004: 126). 
None the less, I believe that there is a place for evaluative research, they make an 
important contribution to the field of peace education and must be encouraged. There have 
been some excellent examples of peace education initiatives which offer great insight and 
further understandings of how to promote peace, providing the much needed practical 
guidance to practitioners in the field. It is also increasingly important if peace education and 
peace orientated development is to compete for funding in an increasingly evidenced-based 
political climate. While this is helpful in the legitimate drive of informing policymaking and 
practice, however, I would argue that this should not be the sole domain of research on peace 
and peace education. Research and scholarship around theories of peace which contribute to 
diverse theoretically informed approaches to peace education are equally important, and will 
help peace educators to develop critically engaging projects and challenge the prominence of 
liberal peace. 
My aim in this article is to introduce my theoretical ambition to imagine peace 
differently, developed in my Ph.D. As already discussed the motivation and catalyst of this 
has been a critique of liberal peace, and I hope to add to the conversations already occurring 
in the field of peace education which explore alternative theories and approaches to peace. 
My desire is to contribute to this conversation in the hope of   bolstering,   continuing and 
widening the discussion, in order to provide peace educators with a growing compilation of 
thoughts and thinking on peace that provide alternatives to liberal peace from which they can 
draw to inform their work. 
 
 
Peace-as-an-event-peace-as-utopia 
In my Ph.D. thesis I explore how Bloch’s realm of the Not Yet (1985) and Derrida’s work on 
the event, most famously justice (1992), can inform an undecided and fluid understanding of 
peace. Peace-as-an-event-peace-as-utopia combines aspects of Bloch’s work on utopia and 
the Derridean event to stress an  undecided and  uncontained future which  houses  an  ethical 
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space ‘to come’, creating a poetic understanding of peace which seeks to agitate fixed ideas 
and create space for alternative thinking. 
 
 
Peace as Utopia 
Hope has always played a significant role in my perseverance in the topic of peace education. 
Having chosen the field of conflict and education as the focus for my preliminary exploration 
of post-graduate research I soon opted for peace education because of its potential for ‘good 
news’. It is not difficult to see, therefore, why in search for an alternative understanding of 
peace I turned to the political philosopher of hope, Ernst Bloch, informed by the works 
Anderson (2006), Levitas (1997) and Moylan (1997). Bloch develops a language of hope in 
The Principle of Hope (1985) which builds a utopia orientated in real possibility, where hope 
is understood not “only as emotion… but more essentially as a direct act of a cognitive kind” 
(Bloch 1985: v1, 12). For Bloch a concrete utopia is cognizant of the possible. A concrete 
utopia replaces wishful thinking with will-full thinking. 
The central thesis of Bloch’s concrete utopia is the unfinished nature of the world as 
undecided, which he termed the realm of the Not Yet. This views an unfinished world whose 
future is not determined, and the essential utopian function is to anticipate and affect the 
future. In an unfinished world in a continual state of process, whose outcome is not 
predetermined, the future consists of real possibilities. Utopia functions as the refusal to 
respect the constraints of external conditions. 
According to Bloch these real possibilities, even if not realised, are part of reality but 
at  its  very  edge,  a  place  that  he  calls  Front.  Front  is  the  utopianly  open  matter  for 
participating and changing the future, which Bloch describes as “the so little thought-out, 
foremost segment of animated, utopianly open matter” (Bloch 1985: v1, 200). 
It is important to note that Not Yet is always “utopianly open” (Bloch 1985: v1, 200). 
Bloch never produced an outline of utopia and Moylan warns us to “resist all efforts to 
contain its potentially unbound hope in any hypostatized definition” (Moylan 1997: 115). It is 
the undecidabilty inherent in Not Yet and Front that is central to Bloch’s utopian function. 
Levitas reminds us, “with no other writer is the rejection of form as a defining characteristic 
of utopia as consistent and explicit as it is with Bloch” (Levitas 1990: 100). It is from this 
undecidedness that I turn to the event. 
 
 
Peace as an event 
Informed by the work of Derrida (1992) peace can be re-imagined as an event. My 
understanding of an event is that which cannot be contained or institutionalised in language 
because it will always  exceed the historical  and cultural.  In this sense the event  is the 
potential which language fails to contain. In this case the word, or signifier, ‘peace’ points 
towards something greater than itself, the event peace. Because the event exceeds its name 
any attempt to codify, thematise, or objectivise the event immediately betrays it by trying to 
contain it. The paradigmatic example of the event can be found in the example of justice. 
Justice cannot be contained within the written law, which attempts to set out justice but never 
fully succeeds. The law can never fully encompass justice as it is possible for it to 
simultaneously represent   injustice, for  example  the  destruction  of private  property is  an 
   
 
 
 
 
injustice until it is done in the name of justice, for example in a revolution. The impossibility 
of containing justice in an affirmative, written code left Derrida to conclude that “this idea of 
justice seems irreducible in the affirmative character” (Derrida 1992: 25). In this example 
justice is impossible to signify in language because it will always exceed it. The event is not 
only limited to justice, and other events include ideas such as democracy, hospitality and 
friendship. While Derrida did not write about peace as an event, it does show a good family 
resemblance, and I draw on his work on these events alongside Caputo’s (2006) work on a 
theology of an event (whose work has heavily influenced my reading of Derrida) to inform 
my understanding of peace. 
The event peace can be viewed as something different from its name. The name, or 
signifier, is not peace, but that which points towards peace, while the event peace is the 
excess which cannot be reduced to the signifier. However, while the event peace is different 
from its name they are intrinsically related and it is not my intention to sever the two. The 
relationship between the signifier and the signified, in this case the signifier peace and the 
event peace, is characterrised by a spacing called différance, and it is the différance which 
produces a translation of peace. The space between the signifier peace and the event peace 
cannot be closed, it is impossible for the name to contain the event, which always exceeds it 
and will therefore burst out of any attempt to confine it. Therefore the word peace defers 
meaning, is always different from the event peace it attempts to signify. This differential 
spacing enables the endless linkages involved in translation and resists closure. By locating 
one’s self in the différance a deconstructive space emerges where peace is not stable and 
closed but tentative and open, where new opportunities for reconstruction emerge. 
Deconstruction and reconstruction play in the differential space between the signifier and the 
event they attempt to signify. 
 
 
Peace-as-an-event-peace-as-utopia 
Using both the works of Bloch and Derrida, I hope to bring both the idea of peace as utopia 
and peace as an event together as peace-as-an-event-peace-as-utopia. I believe utopia and the 
event share four important similarities: 
 
 
 
 
 
i. Open-ended 
Both Derrida and Bloch stress an undecided and uncontainable future, which houses an 
ethical  space  ‘to  come’.  Both  uphold  the  irreducible  nature  of  the  undecided  and 
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uncontainable as the very virtue that enables the promissory hope of the future, one which 
can never be reduced to being, yet which they simultaneously demand. 
Derrida achieves this through the uncontainability of the event which is “possible as 
an experience of the impossible” (Derrida 1992: 15). The event peace is impossible because 
it is the promise of something ‘to come’, always differing peace as an ethical space in the 
future. However, its impossibility is no excuse not to pursue it, instead its possibility lies 
precisely in its impossibility. The impossibility of peace keeps it open-ended, retaining its 
potential, rather than closing it off, and the impossible characteristic of the event is that which 
makes it possible. We can see this in glimpses and experiences of the impossible in the 
authentic acts of forgiveness, giving, hospitality and judgement, which for Derrida are 
impossible, yet they happen all the time even if they are relatively uncertain, temporary and 
hardly noticeable. If the possible is the foreseeable future for which we can reasonably 
anticipate,  the  event  peace  is  something  that,  by  its  very  definition,  shatters  pre-given 
horizons and exceeds all expectations. 
Bloch achieves this open-endedness through the undecided nature of the Not Yet, 
which must always remain “utopianly open” (Bloch 1985: v1, 200). The refusal to respect 
the constraints of external conditions found in Bloch’s work is a resistance to closure and 
offers instead an opening. As “utopia stands in the horizon of every reality” (Bloch 1985: v1, 
223), every moment offers a horizon of possibilities and resists the decline of multiplicity. 
 
 
ii. Aspirational 
Both Bloch’s and Derrida’s work is aspirational. Derrida achieves this through the event’s 
translatability. The impossibility of Derrida’s event makes peace act as an open-ended 
promise, which aspires towards itself. The relationship between the signifier peace and the 
event peace creates a cycle of translation. Because the word peace cannot contain the event 
peace, no translation, not even a good translation, will capture it adequately. And so a new 
translation is offered which improves on the previous yet is still partial, and so the cycle 
continues. Always aspirational, therefore, the event peace sets off chains off new 
understanding which continually surpass each other.  The event peace is always searching for 
“the excess or break that exceeds and shocks our expectations, which thereby depends upon 
anticipatory expectations and pre-given horizons that have been set too low or with too 
narrow a tolerance” (Caputo 1997: 22). 
Bloch achieves this through the cornerstone of utopia, the language of hope, which 
inherently means to look forward and to aspire, “Anticipatory Consciousness” being such a 
central theme that it became the subtitle to volume two of The Principle of Hope. For Bloch 
the capacity to press beyond the external conditionalities of the lived moment towards an 
anticipatory moment derives from the human experience of longing. This can be captured in 
his high regard for the creative arts, stemmed from their ability to cross the boundary into the 
Not Yet conscious. For Bloch, art has the power to embody hope and imagine alternatives, 
making the aspirational function of art-forms a recurrent theme in Bloch’s work on utopia. 
   
 
 
 
 
iii. Rooted in the present/past 
As well as the event and utopia sharing an aspiration for the future, both also, situate 
themselves in the present. The ethical space ‘to come’ utilised by Bloch and Derrida is not a 
distant  dream but  is  seen in the  present, although as a specter  which haunts  the  now while 
resisting its grasp. Bloch achieves this through his idea of Front, the utopianly open space at 
the very edge of reality where the next is determined, and Derrida through the nature of 
translatability, which ties the event closely to its translation so that “at the same time that it 
starts something new, it also continues something, is true to the memory of its past, to a 
heritage” (Derrida, in Derrida and Caputo 1997: 6). 
 
 
iv. Process of engagement 
Both engage with utopia and the event through criticism/deconstruction. Bloch positions 
criticism as the central process of engagement, while Derrida seeks to disturb the present and 
the prestige of historically and culturally constructed language through deconstruction. 
Respectively, criticism and deconstruction are correlated to hope and reconstruction. 
 
 
In addition to these four characteristics that come together in peace-as-an-event-peace-as- 
utopia it is also worth mentioning two other important aspects of this theory of peace, that 
peace is also weak and perilous. 
 
 
Weak 
The open-endedness of peace-as-an-event-peace-as-utopia which allows for its aspiration 
and translation also makes its weak. By nature of being irreducible peace remains soft and 
tentative, resisting historically, geographically and culturally constructed languages which 
seek to contain and institutionalise it. While it rejects the constraints of language it 
simultaneously rejects the power and prestige afforded to concrete entities. Instead a 
deliteralised peace “deprives the present of its prestige and exposes it to something… beyond 
what is foreseeable from the present” (Caputo in Derrida and Caputo 1997:42). 
 
 
Perilous 
Just as the open-endedness that accounts for the aspirational and translatable nature of peace 
results in a weak peace, so too does it make it a risky endeavour. The open-endedness comes 
together with an undecided future,  which must be retained to allow for the excess and 
potential of peace, however, by the very nature of its undecidabilty there is no way of 
knowing which direction its translation will take. The endless linkages may spark off chains 
of translation allow peace to surpass itself, however they can equally destabilise it and 
diminish  it.  Consequently  peace-as-an-event-peace-as-utopia  is  always  menaced  by  the 
threat of disintegration through translation. 
 
 
From theory to practice: Implications for peace education 
From the outset my commitment to a theoretical framing of peace has been to aid peace 
educators and practitioners, and while peace-as-an-event-peace-as-utopia may be more 
abstract  than   problem-solving orientated  scholarship,   it  is  still  helpful  to  inform  peace 
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education programmes. My case so far has pressed a re-imagining of peace - I have put 
forward a case for rethinking peace, and by resisting a strong, instrumental, and closed 
discourse I have re-imagined peace as a weak, aspirational, and open-ended promise. While I 
have shunned  the  problem-solving approach of  the technocrats, and  resisted any kind  of 
solution for peace, this rethinking of peace does have implications for how we engage with 
peace and move it forward, since part of moving towards a peaceful solution may come from 
how we approach peace in the first place. 
While peace-as-an-event-peace-as-utopia may appear to have a strong transcendental 
philosophical leaning, it would be erroneous to assume that, therefore, it has no ethical or 
political impact. Bloch’s work is more obviously based in a materialist world, with his 
emphasis on a ‘concrete’ utopia and obligation to anticipate and affect the future. Derrida too, 
is committed to a material world, extensively writing on responsibility and decision, which 
exist only as an action in the aporia which precedes it. By re-imaging peace as an open-ended 
promise my intention is to free it from that which would prevent it. While it may seem that 
the irreducibility of the event peace could be interpreted as an excuse not to address peace, 
my research instead interprets it as a possibility to move knowledge and praxis forwards. 
Far from being transcendental, peace-as-an-event-peace-as-utopia has ethical and 
political implications for peace’s being and becoming in this world. While I have stressed the 
uncertain nature of peace throughout, I have also stressed a responsibility to interact with 
peace in an attempt to move it forward, and have never used its irreducibility and flux as an 
excuse not to engage. What can be said about Derrida’s work on democracy can similarly be 
said about peace, and one could easily substitute the word democracy and democratic with 
peace and peaceful in the following quote: 
 
 
“The infinite arrive, the “to come”, does not entail a passivity toward a working and striving 
toward a democratic state, it only recognises that the notion of absolute arrival, an absolute here 
and now of democracy without a future always to come, contains the seeds of totalised thinking. 
Democracy needs the “to come” of the future or it is not democracy” (Anker 2009: 44). 
 
 
The irreducible nature of peace, therefore does not ‘let us off the hook’ so to speak, but 
“calls us toward thinking here and now, a here and now, however, always open to a non- 
totalised elsewhere and a future to come” (ibid 48). This imperative to engage with peace 
here and now creates a responsibility to demand peace now, while simultaneously deferring 
it. To understand philosophically one needs to locate meaning in the physical world, so while 
a conceptual understanding of peace helps us to think about peace, it also helps us to think 
about peace as we experience it in this world. In this sense peace has meaning, not in any 
sense of other-worldliness, but in a contextualised space of production. 
This has implications for how we engage in peace education. For me, once you have re- 
imagined peace as utopia and an event, it impacts how you approach, discuss, and engage 
with  it  on  every  level.  The  recognition  of  the  partiality  of  this  knowledge  and  its 
translatability should inform how it is approached and how it can be moved forward. Through 
recognising the reciprocal incompleteness of differing and contradictory understandings of 
peace, a space for dialogue emerges which can aid the translation of peace, both as a concept 
and  experience.  The  inherent  translatability  of  peace  enables  it  to  naturally  produce 
   
 
 
 
 
translations of its own accord; however this natural process could be enhanced by the work of 
translation. 
 
 
Peace education as the work of translation 
The translation of peace is an important part of its promissory potential and hope for the ‘to 
come’. It is the translation that enables the movement of peace, continuously bursting out of 
its   inadequate   interpretations   to   realise   new   translations   that   surpass   our   previous 
expectations. 
Santos’ (2005) vision on the work of translation offers some important theoretical 
insights into the translation of peace, and has helped me to start thinking about the translation 
of peace as a type of peace education. Santo’s notion of translation is not identical to 
Derrida’s; most noticeably he employs the idea of a diatopical hermeneutics (Santos 2002) 
where multiple perspectives converge in translation. 
Arguing that, using enlightenment reasoning, the West actively produces the non- 
existence  of  alternative  thinking,  Santos  contrasts  ‘the  sociology  of  absences’  with  the 
‘ecology of knowledges’. Contrasted to the monoculture of a concrete definitive that creates 
absences, “the idea of multiplicity and non-destructive relations is suggested by the concept 
of ecology” (Santos 2004: 240). Santos suggests that traditionally the West has promoted her 
interests through scientific knowledge, which produces an exclusive ‘canon of truth’, 
consequently discrediting or trivialising alternative knowledges through the criteria of 
objective truth and efficiency. However, Santos argues that instead of a destructive 
relationship where a hegemonic monoculture actively produces inferior knowledges, a non- 
destructive relationship between knowledges is possible; this relationship is based on the 
work of translation. For Santos the work of translation involves addressing common concerns 
in an attempt to increase awareness of reciprocal incompleteness which brings different 
cultures together as “the future of hope that another world is possible as an alternative to 
single thinking” (Santos 2005:15). 
The uncontainability and open-endedness  of peace and  its inherent  translatability 
opens it up to the work of translation. The translatable nature of peace means that it will have 
differing translations for different groups, contexts and times, creating “ecologies of 
knowledges” (Santos 2007) and because the event peace is endlessly translatable none of 
these knowledges will be adequate or complete interpretations. The realisation of the 
incomplete nature of any peace knowledge is a central condition for the work of translation. 
The acceptance that all understandings of peace fall short in some areas leads to the need to 
translate peace further, surpassing the limited translations available. In Santos’ idea of a 
diatopical hermeneutics (Santos 2002), where translation takes the perspective of all sides, 
new translations can be built in cooperation with multiple understandings of peace and the 
work of translation offers a shared comprehension of the experiences and understandings of 
peace. 
Diatopical hermeneutics reveals the incompleteness of a given knowledge from the 
perspective of an alternative knowledge, which is also incomplete. The exploration of the 
reciprocal  incompleteness  creates  a  space  for  dialogue  and  the  translation  of  new 
knowledges. Santos (2002)  uses the example of Western Human Rights  and  Muslim  umma 
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(community) to illustrate how different interpretations of human dignity can work together to 
form new translations of human dignity. From the perspective of umma, Western human 
rights are too individualist. The absence of collective rights erodes principles of solidarity and 
group linkages which are an important aspect of a thriving society. Alternatively umma, from 
a human rights perspective, finds its short comings in its detriment of the individual, where 
faithfulness to the collective overrides otherwise objectionable inequalities, such as the 
inequality between the treatment of those in the group and those outside of the group. 
Santos is clear to point out that while the work of translation is concerned with 
multiple knowledges it should not be mistaken as cultural relativism, and does not 
automatically lead to an ‘all narratives are equally valid’ position. The work of translation 
requires a reciprocal respect for multiple knowledges, but that does not mean that no 
judgement can be passed on them. In this situation respect means worthy of critical reflection, 
where  disagreement  is  not  the  same  thing  as  mere  dismissal.  Furthermore,  a  cultural 
relativism fails to recognise the perils of translation, and the objective of the work of 
translation is to facilitate a “race to the top rather than to the bottom” (ibid: 46). The work of 
translation is not concerned with the simple acceptance of different translations of peace, 
instead its main objective is to promote cross-cultural dialogue in order to cultivate a will to 
produce collectively knowledges and practices with the potential to deepen peace. 
Santo’s image of the work of translation provides an important starting point for 
thinking about peace education as a work of translation – the process of translating peace in 
context. The intentional work of the translation of peace can act to protect peace from 
disintegration through translation or speed up naturally occurring translation. To my mind his 
diatopical hermeneutics read like a kind of critical dialogue, and in my research context of 
Mindanao, home to a protracted conflict couched in religious language between Muslims and 
Christians, diatopical hermeneutics did seem to hold some relevance for translating 
understandings of peace. There was evidence of a work of translation characterised by cross- 
cultural dialogue and interpretation, which is illustrated particularly well in the example of 
Mindanao’s future. Considering the shared concern of peace, there was a reciprocal 
incompleteness between future visions for an Islamic Mindanao and the continuation of a 
‘Filipino’ (read as Christian) Mindanao, as one vision denies significant representation of 
ethnic Muslims (or Muslim culture in government and institutions) and the other denies 
Christians’ representation. That both options are incomplete and fail to secure a peaceful 
future for the whole population of Mindanao led to the consideration of alternative options 
for a few of my participants. A shared comprehension of what peace means led some of the 
Muslim participants to think about the anxieties of the Mindanao Christian population in their 
aspiration for a peaceful future for Muslims. This was revealed in the assurances they offered 
Christians that conversion was not the objective of an Islamic Mindanao and Christians will 
be  free  to  practice  their  religion  under  an  Islamic  solution.  One  Muslim  participant 
particularly named the Christian poor in his vision for a peaceful Islamic Mindanao, asserting 
that land reform is for all the dispossessed. While these concessions did not completely 
address the incompleteness of an Islamic Mindanao as a solution for peace (Christians would 
still be unrepresented in government), they reveal a dialectical hermeneutics, where one side 
is showing a willingness and ability to view the concern from both sides. 
   
 
 
 
 
However, conflict situations are complex, and when translating peace special 
considerations arising from the context may need to be taken into account, for example 
marginalized groups may feel understandably defensive and resistant to critique. This was 
also the case in my research context, where the colonial history of the massacres of Muslim 
populations in Mindanao, and the current Christian tide of aggressive conversion and 
Islamaphobia made Muslim populations defensive. In some conflict situations it may be 
necessary, as an act of strategic reversal, for the more powerful groups to bear the majority of 
the critique, though only at the start of the process. In situations where sensitive and complex 
histories and circumstances prevent an overt dialectic hermeneutics characterized by critical 
dialogue, a significant challenge is posed to the work of translation. However, translation is 
something that naturally occurs as a result of the nature of the event peace and its 
irreducibility, and this provides some optimism in these cases. By refocusing on a naturally 
occurring translatability debate and dialogue is not necessarily required, and in situations 
where it would possibly entrench existing divisions, there are other ways for divergent groups 
to challenge each other, such as by example. This is where divergent groups can come to 
work together, where contact is facilitated for informal discussion and cross-over, and the 
work and actions of the groups will reflect the different values of those who come together. 
This can be illustrated by another example from my research. In this case a Christian NGO 
teamed up with Muslim volunteers, and in the process of co-running development projects in 
Muslim  communities  upstanding  Muslim  community  leaders  befriended  and  worked 
alongside gay ethnic Muslim volunteers from their community. During the continued work in 
the community the acceptance of the gay volunteers by the Christian NGO started to shift the 
attitude towards gay men for some of the Muslim community leaders involved in the projects. 
A shift towards peace occurred for those gay men who now feel accepted by at least some of 
the more religiously devout. This can be described as a work of translation because the 
Christian NGO intentionally partnered with Muslim communities, and their example helped 
to move understandings of peace forward to include the understanding of peace for gay men. 
The work of translation can be seen as the work of peace education, as illustrated in 
the examples above. However, although as the examples show, Santos’ understanding of the 
work of translation offers a helpful place to start thinking about what that might look like, 
nevertheless it is important to build creative and alternative practices from this. By re- 
focusing on Derrida we come to a more elusive, subtle and sometimes mysterious 
understanding of the work of translation, to include that which is inherent and naturally 
occurs, understanding that the work of translation embodies both of these understandings and 
that they overlap and connect to each other. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have shown how a re-imagining of peace can challenge the dominant discourse 
of liberal peace in order to open-up a journey towards an excessive, aspirational peace. The 
work of translation offers the means to travel with peace as it spills out of the words which 
try to contain it and moves towards aspirations yet to be born.  The work of translation offers 
this opportunity not only through dialogue, but also engagement, and while the outcome is 
ambiguous, this ambiguity holds the seed of hope for peace.   It is the uncertainty and  flux of 
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the journey that opens a new optimism where opportunities for transformation are multiplied. 
The work of the translation of peace can be understood in the utopian spirit of hope, which 
plays on the Not Yet, where the future is still to be decided, and in the flux of the Derridean 
event, where uncertainty and irreducibility provide the opportunity for new possibilities. 
In this paper I have contributed to a conversation around a theory of peace, offering 
peace educators a substantially new way of understanding peace, and a short exploration of 
the implications and possibilities it holds. This poses challenges for practitioners and 
researchers to further understanding of, and develop, new methods of translation which will 
retain the weakness of peace, diminishing the power to inscribe new understandings as 
concrete, and will also guard against the inherent peril involved in translation. It also requires 
that we understand what peace looks like in all of its impossibility, aspiration, weakness and 
peril in particular contexts. This means that not only must peace educators become learners of 
peace, but that peace is understood as an experience in this world, involving not only a 
discursive change, but also a material change. 
My ambition to re-imagine peace is not confined to theory, and my efforts to research 
translation praxis are glimpsed in the couple of examples I offer from my own research in my 
discussion on translation. This paper focuses primarily on a theory of peace and its 
implications, and therefore further discussion of my research findings are beyond its scope, 
however, my motivation to explore theory comes from a commitment to practice. My hope is 
that this paper provides a starting point for further discussion on the development of the work 
of peace education as the work of translation, and contributes to theoretically informed, but 
practice relevant outcomes. I look forward to contributing to this broader discussion with 
further papers which explore and map ecologies of peace and translation praxis from my 
Ph.D. research in Mindanao as one example of many possibilities. 
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